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Kierkegaard, Paraphrase, and the Unity of Form and Content 
Writing about Kierkegaard presents numerous difficulties.1
Yet, writing about or even paraphrasing Kierkegaard requires no special literary 
talent. It demands no particular flair for the poetic, unless clarity and straightforwardness 
should count. The use of literary tropes might even be a defect. It might obscure one’s 
explanation of Kierkegaard’s ideas. It might undermine one’s ability to make what he says 
more transparent. 
 Some stem from his poetic or 
literary style. This is particularly true when the goal is to clarify his philosophical positions 
and arguments. Such things seldom appear on the surface of his texts. To uncover them, one 
must acquire a knack for reading between the lines. One must develop a skill set more 
commonly associated with interpreting art than understanding philosophy. 
The foregoing paragraph states an intuitive position. Many Kierkegaard commentators 
would accept it, even if few publicly have.2 Several contemporary aestheticians might 
support it as well.3 However, Kierkegaard himself rejects the notion.4 He says we cannot 
paraphrase in a straightforward fashion some of the ideas he expresses in an artistic format. 
To use the words of Johannes Climacus, these ideas defy direct communication.5
What Kierkegaard says is both intriguing and troublesome. If true, it requires us to 
reassess how we write about Kierkegaard, and perhaps how we think about the relationship 
between the form and content of philosophical writing more generally. Thus, we would like 
to know why Kierkegaard said it, and whether we should believe him. My primary goal is to 
answer these questions. More precisely, I aim to piece together and defend the justification he 
offers for his position.
   
6 At the end of the paper, I will discuss some implications for 
contemporary scholarship. An excursus into Kierkegaard’s aesthetics will serve as my point 
of departure. 
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I. The Unity of Form and Content 
“Form” and “content” are notoriously ambiguous words. Thus, “unity of form and content” 
can mean many things.7 Some scholars employ the expression to pick out a good-making 
feature of works of art. For them, “content” refers to what an artwork represents, expresses, 
or embodies, i.e. its theme, meaning, or subject matter. “Form,” by contrast, refers to how an 
artwork presents its content to us or the manner in which it does so. Thus understood, form 
and content comprise a unity when the two elements fit together well. Such a fit occurs when 
the form of a work of art serves as a particularly effective vehicle for conveying its content.8
[T]he content, subject matter, meaning or theme of The Fall of Icarus is the way in 
which epoch-making history passes us by unnoticed. . . . This theme is articulated by 
decentering the subject of the painting—Icarus’s legendary fall—off to one side 
where it is likely to be missed, thereby presenting and reinforcing the meaning of the 
work through its visual appearance. . . . The very design of the painting brings its 
meaning home to us. It is a deftly suitable means for making us aware of what the 
painting is about.
 
Noël Carroll’s discussion of Pieter Bruegel’s painting, The Fall of Icarus, illustrates the idea:  
9
This position suffers from its share of problems.
  
10 Nevertheless, several nineteenth-
century philosophers embraced it. Hegel, for instance, defended a version in the lectures he 
delivered on aesthetics during the 1820’s.11 Several Danish Hegelians subsequently brought 
the view to Copenhagen. The aesthetician Johan Ludwig Heiberg (1791-1860) served as the 
primary conduit for the flow of ideas, writing and speaking about the topic extensively during 
Kierkegaard’s student days.12 Unsurprisingly, the tradition influenced Either/Or (1843). In 
fact, A, the pseudonymous author of the first volume, relies on it to explain the greatness of 
classic works of art.13  
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As part of his account, A discusses why failing to exhibit a unity of form and content 
detracts from a work of art. On his view, the problem is not that disunity results in a loss of 
beauty, elegance, or some other uncontroversially aesthetic property. It is rather that disunity 
leads to conveying content in an ineffective manner. More precisely, when the form and 
content of an artwork do not fit each other, the artwork presents its content inaccurately. 
A develops this position in his essay on Mozart’s Don Giovanni. He argues that we 
should regard Mozart’s opera as the greatest of all works of art.14 It deserves such reverence 
partly because it exhibits the greatest possible unity of form and content.15
The most abstract idea conceivable is the sensual [Sandselig] in its elemental 
originality. But through which medium can [the sensual, the immediate erotic] be 
presented? Only through music. It cannot be presented in sculpture because it has a 
qualification of a kind of inwardness; it cannot be painted, for it cannot be caught in 
definite contours. In its lyricism, it is a force, a wind, impatience, passion, etc., yet in 
such a way that it exists not in one instant but in a succession of instants, for if it 
existed in one instant, it could be depicted or painted. That it exists in a succession of 
instants expresses its epic character, but still it is not epic in the stricter sense, for it 
has not reached the point of words; it continually moves within immediacy. 
Consequently, it cannot be presented in poetry, either. The only medium that can 
present it is music. . . . In Mozart’s Don Giovanni, we have the perfect unity of this 
idea and its corresponding form.
 Mozart has not 
merely hit upon a compelling way to represent the opera’s subject matter of erotic love. The 
chosen medium of music is the only way to accomplish the task: 
16
In this passage, A revives a view defended by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) and 
Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786), the former of whom he cites explicitly.
 
17 Lessing and 
Mendelssohn held that many if not all artistic mediums have limitations. Because of their 
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physical properties, they cannot be used to represent certain things. For example, a painting 
only offers viewers an image of an individual time slice in the history of its object. 
Consequently, it can only accurately depict that which is confined to an individual time slice. 
It will do injustice to anything extended across time, such as movement or change. Similarly, 
a sculpture only presents a three-dimensional body to those who behold it. Thus, it can only 
properly portray such a body. It is ill-suited to capturing actions, abstractions, and the inner 
stirrings of the soul.18
A’s argument is largely
 
19 an application of Lessing and Mendelssohn’s theory. He 
begins by pointing out that the subject matter of Don Giovanni is both invisible and 
protracted in time. While erotic love is transitory, it lasts longer than an instant. In addition, it 
concerns the inward aspects of human life and not (just) the outward or bodily ones.20
Judge William develops a similar line of thought in the second volume of Either/Or.
 A 
concludes that no artist can accurately represent this subject matter in the medium of painting 
or sculpture. 
21 
He begins with the following assumption. Art, by which the judge means painting and 
sculpture, concentrates everything in the moment.22 It represents how things look at a 
particular point in time. Therefore, art only has one appropriate subject matter, namely the 
class of things that exist merely for one moment or that can be reduced to what takes place in 
a moment. It will distort anything else.23
Like A, the judge believes some things fall outside the domain of topics capable of 
accurate artistic depiction. His primary example is marital love. The ideal husband, the judge 
claims, does not express his love for his spouse simply by being faithful at one decisive point 
in time. He does so by remaining true to her every moment of every day.
 
24 Thus, marital love 
is essentially extended in time.25 Reducing it to what happens at any particular moment 
would obscure this fact. Consequently, art cannot accurately represent marital love: 
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Romantic love can be portrayed very well in the moment; marital love cannot, for an 
ideal husband is not one who is ideal once in his life but one who is that every day. If 
I wish to portray a hero who conquers kingdoms and countries, this can be done very 
well in the moment, but a cross-bearer who takes up his cross every day can never be 
portrayed in either poetry or art, for the point is that he does it every day.26
The judge makes the same claim about humility: 
 
Humility is hard to portray precisely because it is sequence, and . . . [the observer] 
really needs to see something that poetry and art cannot provide, to see its continuous 
coming into existence, for it is essential to humility to come into existence 
continuously, and if this is shown to him in its ideal moment, he misses something, 
for he senses that its true ideality consists not in its being ideal at the moment but in 
its being continuous.27
In summary, according to Judge William, using painting or sculpture to portray something 
essentially extended in time does that thing violence. It compacts what is by nature 
protracted. The resultant work of art misleads viewers. It gives the false impression that its 
subject matter possesses a pregnant or decisive moment.
 
28
This general aesthetic theory also receives attention from Johannes Climacus in 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Climacus makes an important contribution to the 
discussion because he focuses on linguistic media instead of painting and sculpture. Take the 
following passage: 
  
[J]ust as easy as it is to state that a human being is nothing before God, so is it 
difficult to express this in existence. But to describe and depict this in more detail is in 
turn difficult, because speech is surely a more abstract medium than existence, and in 
relation to the ethical all speech involves a little deception, because speech, despite 
the most subtle and skilled precautionary measures, always still has an appearance of 
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the foreshortened perspective. Therefore, even if the discourse makes the most 
enthusiastic and most desperate effort to show how difficult it is, or makes an extreme 
effort in an indirect form, it still always remains more difficult to do than it appears in 
the discourse.29
Here Climacus asserts that the struggle to see oneself as nothing before God is always more 
difficult than it comes across in a description of the task. “Easier said than done,” we might 
put it. This point has interesting consequences. It entails we cannot use language to represent 
the subject matter in question. At least not accurately. Not without “a little deception.” Thus, 
like A and Judge William, Climacus maintains that presenting content in the wrong form 
gives people the wrong impression of it. 
 
II. Form-Content Contradictions 
Around the time Kierkegaard published these ideas on the relationship between form and 
content in works of art, he began to think about a parallel issue in academic discourse. He 
started to wonder whether expressing his philosophical convictions might require the use of a 
particular style, perhaps one distinct from the kind found in stereotypical academic 
treatises.30
Many of Kierkegaard’s contemporaries shared his concern.
 
31 Indeed, some of the 
early German Romantics, most notably Novalis (Friedrich von Hardenberg (1772-1801)) and 
Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1829), raised a similar question.32 They asked whether they could 
express their views accurately in a systematic fashion. In the end, they decided they could 
not. So they abandoned the systematic format employed by many philosophers of their day in 
favor of a fragmentary one. Their reflections and decisions paved the way for 
Kierkegaard’s.33  
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We might wonder, however, why any of these thinkers looked for a fit between the 
form and content of their philosophical writing. At first glance, their quest seems misguided. 
Unity of form and content is an aesthetic property. It is a good-making feature of works of 
art. Philosophical writing does not aim at the creation of art, let alone good art. (At least qua 
philosophical writing it does not do so.) Its goal is to provide clear and compelling accounts, 
explanations, or justifications of theories, phenomena, concepts, etc. Someone can perform 
these tasks, and perform them well, without constructing a work of art in the process. Thus, it 
should not count against a piece of philosophical writing if its form does not fit its content. 
And Kierkegaard and the Romantics should not have troubled themselves with finding such a 
fit. 
Yet they did so trouble themselves, and we learn much by learning why. Consider 
again the rationale behind criticizing a mismatch between form and content in a work of art. 
A, Judge William, and Climacus explain the criticism by saying that artistically representing 
content in the wrong form results in distortion. It involves failing to portray the subject matter 
accurately. I believe we catch a glimpse here of the problem bothering Kierkegaard, Novalis, 
and Schlegel. They feared that presenting philosophical content in the wrong form meant 
expressing it in an impoverished way. 
 We can develop this suggestion by examining another passage from Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript. In this one, Climacus says a failure of fit between the form and 
content of one’s communication can generate a contradiction. With a touch of sarcasm, he 
declares: 
To require of a thinker that he contradict [modsige] his entire thought and his world-
view by the form he gives his communication, to console him by saying that in this 
way he will be beneficial, to let him remain convinced that nobody cares about it, 
indeed, that nobody notices it in these objective times, since such extreme conclusions 
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are merely tomfoolery, which every systematic day laborer regards as nothing—well, 
that is good advice, and also quite cheap.34
If correct, Climacus’s view has interesting consequences. A contradiction in one’s 
communication is not (merely) an aesthetic defect. It is a philosophical one. Thus, failing to 
exhibit a unity of form and content would result not (just) in bad art but in bad philosophy. 
 
Is Climacus correct? I believe so. To see why, we must understand how the problem 
he mentions can arise. We must grasp how the style of a piece of communication can 
contradict its content. 
Climacus offers us little explicit help on this point. However, by inference from some 
examples he uses, one of which we will inspect momentarily, I surmise he makes tacit use of 
a principle endorsed by several aestheticians today. The principle states that the style or form 
of one’s writing can implicitly express a claim. Consequently, the form of one’s writing is not 
entirely distinct from its content. Rather, the form contributes to the content or has a kind of 
content all its own.35
With this principle in place, the possibility of form-content contradictions follows 
relatively quickly. The implicit claims expressed by the form of a piece of writing can state 
one thing. The explicit claims expressed by the content of that piece of writing—i.e. the 
content not implied by the form and that I will call the lexical or semantic content—can state 
something else. These two sets of claims can then contradict each other. 
  
This explanation gives rise to a new question. How can the style or form of a text 
implicitly express a claim? Once again, Climacus provides few overt answers. However, he 
does supply examples of form-content contradictions. The most telling one occurs in the lines 
immediately following the passage quoted above: 
Suppose it was the life-view of a religiously existing subject that one may not have 
followers, that this would be treason to both God and men; suppose he were a bit 
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obtuse . . . and announced this directly with unction and pathos—what then? Well, 
then he would be understood and soon ten would apply who, just for a free shave each 
week, would offer their services in proclaiming this doctrine; that is, in further 
substantiation of the truth of his doctrine, he would have been so very fortunate as to 
gain followers who accepted and spread this doctrine about having no follower.36
Note two points about the example. First, the lexical content of the speaker’s communication 
is that human beings should not have followers. Second, the manner in which he 
communicates this content actually prompts people to become his followers. When he 
announces his message “with unction and pathos” he creates an atmosphere that encourages 
those who hear him to take up his cause.  
 
The fact that the speaker induces people to become his followers gives the impression 
that becoming his follower is an appropriate course of action to take. To explain the source of 
this impression, we can appeal, somewhat anachronistically, to Paul Grice’s Cooperative 
Principle. The principle states that we typically assume people engage in cooperative and 
rational behavior.37
Thus, the style employed by the speaker in Climacus’s example implies that 
becoming his follower is appropriate. However, such an implication contradicts the semantic 
content of the speaker’s communication. For, according to the semantic content, becoming a 
follower is not appropriate. Consequently, the speaker’s communication falls prey to a form-
content contradiction. 
 Although Grice does not explicitly say so, in part this means we presume 
that people will encourage others to do only what it is appropriate to do in a given situation. 
Accordingly, when we witness someone encouraging others to do something, we take it that 
he or she believes the action suits the circumstances. 
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III. The Problem for Paraphrasing 
The possibility of form-content contradictions discloses a subtle way paraphrasing can go 
awry. Consider the following example.38 There exists a SparkNotes volume devoted to 
Kierkegaard.39 It contains short summaries of several of his writings. It also provides a brief 
overview of his main arguments and ideas. On a charitable reading, the semantic content of 
the “SparkNote on Søren Kierkegaard” accurately captures the explicit meaning of the works 
it covers. Of course, it does not express or evoke the same profound emotions. It does not 
produce the same powerful effects on its readers. But such shortcomings hardly matter. A 
good paraphrase need only say the same thing as the original, not give rise to all the same 
experiences.40
Given this initial positive assessment, should we consider the SparkNotes paraphrases 
a success? Not necessarily. A problem still arises if (1) the form of the paraphrases implicitly 
expresses something that the form of the originals does not, and (2) this implication 
contradicts the lexical content of the originals. If these conditions obtain, we cannot rightly 
say the SparkNotes volume says what Kierkegaard’s original writings do. For in addition to 
expressing everything the originals do, it would also express something more. And this 
surplus content would be at odds with the content of the originals. Thus, the SparkNotes 
volume would distort the meaning of Kierkegaard’s texts to some degree. 
 
 Does the “SparkNote on Søren Kierkegaard” actually suffer from this problem? It 
seems likely. The abstract and systematic style of the “SparkNote” leads readers to reflect on 
the topics Kierkegaard broaches in a correspondingly abstract and systematic fashion. It 
thereby implies that such reflection is appropriate, a point Kierkegaard rejects.41 Thus, the 
SparkNotes volume does not always express what Kierkegaard’s texts do. It sometimes 
communicates positions that contradict those found in Kierkegaard’s works. In this respect, it 
comes up short as a paraphrase.  
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 This illustration might not vex us too much. It shows there are some stylistic 
restrictions on how we can successfully go about the paraphrase project.42
According to Kierkegaard, stylistic restrictions should concern aspiring paraphrasers 
in a special case, namely when the class of forbidden styles includes the one they wish to use. 
Turning to an example he discusses will clarify his point. The example primarily will concern 
the paraphrase of Postscript attempted by Kierkegaard’s one-time protégé, Rasmus Nielsen 
(1809-1884). However, as we shall see, Nielsen utilizes a writing style many of today’s 
commentators have adopted. Thus, Kierkegaard’s objection to Nielsen will apply to them as 
well. 
 We cannot use just 
any old format we feel like. But so what? As long as these restrictions do not rule out every 
approach, as long as they leave some options open, why should we fret?  
IV. Nielsen’s Paraphrase of Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
We can begin with our own brief paraphrase of Postscript. Doing so is somewhat of a 
necessary evil. It is necessary because we cannot understand Nielsen’s error without grasping 
the position he seeks to paraphrase. A quotation from Postscript would no doubt serve us 
best. However, Climacus presents his position so diffusely no passage of reasonable length 
would do. Providing a paraphrase is somewhat evil because any problem afflicting Nielsen’s 
paraphrase will threaten ours as well. I will return to this issue in the final section of the 
paper. For now we can proceed.  
Postscript contains an account of two ways to approach ethical and religious issues. 
On the one hand, there is the objective way.43 We can recognize it as the approach typically 
taken by academic scholars. Its primary aims are the acquisition of true beliefs and the 
avoidance of false ones. Accordingly, it focuses on the theoretical and empirical justifications 
of various candidates for belief as well as the internal coherence of the same.  
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The objective approach is tied to a specific attitude. Those who adopt it try to be 
disinterested and dispassionate in their intellectual labors.44 They fear that letting their goals, 
values, and emotions come into play will lead to bias and ultimately distortion, undermining 
their pursuit of the truth. Thus, they attempt to set aside their personal points of view as well 
as any consideration for the implications their inquiries might have for their lives. In 
Climacus’s words, they strive to look at matters sub specie aeterni.45
On the other hand, there is the subjective way of approaching ethical and religious 
issues. It is opposed to the objective way in several respects. People who adopt it do not 
directly concern themselves with the justification or internal coherence of the doctrines they 
believe. They focus their attention on the matter of appropriation—of how to make these 
doctrines their own.
 
46 In other words, they concentrate on how to live out the doctrines within 
the confines of their everyday lives. Their attitude throughout this process also differs from 
that taken up by those who pursue the objective approach. They do not strive to be 
disinterested or dispassionate. They do not attempt to disregard the personal implications of 
their intellectual inquiries. Instead, they are passionately interested in what the ethical and 
religious doctrines they encounter mean for them—for who they are, how they should live, 
and the sort of person they should become.47
The main thesis of Postscript is that we should take up the subjective approach when 
dealing with ethical and religious matters.
 
48 Whatever value the objective approach may have 
in other domains, it is inappropriate here.49 This is in part the meaning behind Climacus’s 
famous dictum that, when it comes to ethics and religion, “subjectivity is truth.”50
Rasmus Nielsen sets forth his paraphrases of Postscript in a number of books and 
lectures published around 1850. His most important work in this vein is Magister S. 
Kierkegaard’s “Johannes Climacus” and Dr. H. Martensen’s “Christian Dogmatics.”
 
51 
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Herein Nielsen provides lengthy quotations from Postscript followed by painstaking analysis 
and commentary, the spirit of which I hope to have captured in the foregoing.  
Kierkegaard has harsh words for Nielsen’s project. He declares that he “not only 
cannot give approval but must categorically take exception to Professor Nielsen’s books.”52 
However, his dissatisfaction does not stem from the fact that Nielsen gets Climacus’s 
positions wrong. It stems from the fact that Nielsen presents these positions in the wrong 
style. In other words, Kierkegaard’s objection does not concern what Nielsen says but how he 
says it. He concedes that because of Nielsen “many have now become aware of [Climacus’s] 
cause.”53 But he adds that “the cause has retrogressed, because it has acquired a less 
consistent form.”54
Nielsen proceeds by presenting Postscript as it appears through an academic lens. He 
frames the book within the context of a scholarly debate with some of the Danish Hegelians. 
He even portrays it as a contribution to the debate.
  
55 Most importantly, the manner in which 
Nielsen paraphrases Postscript reflects his academic approach to the text: he uses an abstract, 
disinterested, and dispassionate style of writing.56
To see the defect of Nielsen’s strategy, it helps to step back and consider what often 
happens when we read a text. Usually, we enter into the frame of mind of the perceived 
author. We find ourselves viewing some part of the world or approaching some topic in the 
way the perceived author does. This general pattern holds for Nielsen’s works in particular. 
When reading them, we are led to adopt a scholarly or academic mindset. More precisely, we 
are induced to take up the same objective approach toward the ethical and religious subject 
matter of Postscript as Nielsen does. The fact that Nielsen’s writing style encourages us to 
become objective gives the impression that becoming objective is appropriate. However, as 
discussed, Climacus rejects this claim. Herein lies the flaw in Nielsen’s paraphrase. Its style 
implicitly expresses a claim that contradicts Climacus’s main thesis. 
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We might think Nielsen could escape this contradiction. Climacus’s thesis maintains 
that we must approach ethical and religious matters in a subjective fashion. A contradiction 
arises only if this thesis itself is an ethical or religious matter. But it might not be. It might be 
a higher order statement about ethical and religious matters. If so, Climacus’s thesis would 
not forbid us from approaching it (i.e. the thesis itself) in an objective fashion or from 
encouraging others to do so. Thus, paraphrasing the thesis in the style Nielsen employs would 
not engender a form-content contradiction.  
However, the underlying assumption here is false. According to Climacus, how we 
approach ethical and religious matters is an ethical and religious matter. Single-mindedly 
adopting an objective approach with respect to ethics or religion is an ethical or religious 
failing. It involves an unhealthy kind of self-forgetfulness.57
To summarize, the semantic content of Nielsen’s paraphrase is unproblematic. 
However, as noted in the previous section, that is not good enough. To construct an adequate 
paraphrase it must also be the case that the style one employs does not imply anything at odds 
with the content of the original. Nielsen’s paraphrase fails to meet this additional 
requirement. That is why Kierkegaard takes exception to it.
 Thus, Nielsen’s texts fall prey to 
a form-content contradiction after all. 
58
V. Implications for Contemporary Kierkegaard Scholarship 
 
In the middle decades of the last century, Kierkegaard played the whipping boy in analytic 
philosophical circles. Members of these groups considered him a thinker who at best set forth 
shoddy arguments for dubious conclusions and at worst practiced the dark arts of misology. 
John Laird, for example, described his encounter with Kierkegaard’s writings with the 
following derogatory remarks: “Even in a wide literary interpretation of “philosophy”—and 
no other could be appropriate—I found very little that seemed to be worth stating in a formal 
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way.”59 Brand Blanshard wound up his attack on Kierkegaard in a similar vein: “One reads 
on with gathering disillusionment, coming in the end to realize that Kierkegaard, if a 
philosopher at all, is a distinct species of philosopher, and that it is useless to look for clearly 
stated theses, still less for ordered arguments in support of them.”60
There has been a movement afoot since then to counteract this impression. Many 
Kierkegaard scholars have endeavored to provide a more favorable picture of his work. As 
part of this process, they have offered up rational reconstructions or analytic paraphrases of 
the arguments and views contained in his writings.
 In general, Laird, 
Blanshard, and like-minded folk saw Kierkegaard as a figure of perhaps some literary 
interest, but not one worthy of sustained philosophical attention. 
61
It sounds strange to say, but some Kierkegaard scholars dislike the direction in which 
things have gone.
 Their efforts have enjoyed success and 
Kierkegaard’s philosophical reputation has grown. 
62 Their objection is an existential one, for want of a better word. They 
believe transposing the content of Kierkegaard’s works into “APA-style arguments” robs 
these works of their most valuable possession.63 It saps them of their ability to transform our 
lives, to help us become better human beings. Kierkegaard is a physician of the soul, these 
scholars maintain, one who treats our sickness unto death. Our particular strain of the 
sickness requires a poetic treatment. Handing us a set of propositions or an argument will not 
do, in part because our problem just is that we have an excessive attachment to propositions 
and arguments. Thus, a version of Kierkegaard without the literary trappings lacks the all-
important therapeutic power of his originals.64
On my account, putting an “analytic” face on Kierkegaard’s writings suffers from an 
entirely different flaw. Because it involves approaching Kierkegaard as Nielsen does, it 
commits the same error: it distorts the meaning of some of Kierkegaard’s texts. This is no 
small problem. The analytic paraphrase project typically aims at lending Kierkegaard’s 
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writings an air of greater philosophical respectability. To do so, it must capture the meaning 
of his works accurately. Otherwise, what it champions will not belong to Kierkegaard. He 
and his will not increase because of the effort. 
There is danger here of serious fallout. My conclusion threatens to render pointless 
much analytic scholarship on Kierkegaard’s Postscript. Indeed, if the resultant 
representations of this text are always misrepresentations, how can they help us? Will they 
not just lead us astray? Therefore, we might think scholars of an analytic persuasion should 
jump ship.65 Indeed, on one plausible interpretation, that is the moral of Postscript’s final 
line: “Oh, would that no ordinary seaman will lay a dialectical hand on this work but let it 
stand as it now stands.”66
However, giving up on analytic scholarship of Postscript would be an overreaction.
 
67 
If Kierkegaard effectively recommends it at the end of the book, he makes a mistake. The fact 
that an analytic paraphrase fails in the sense that it distorts the original does not entail that it 
is useless. Even a distortion of a text can serve as a stepping-stone to an accurate 
understanding of it. Moreover, we often need such stepping-stones. Many analytic 
philosophers will pay no mind to Kierkegaard’s writings until it is shown that these writings 
contain coherent arguments. Such arguments do not exist on the surface level of his texts. We 
must piece them together out of the raw materials we find. In other words, we must offer up 
careful, analytic paraphrases. Of course, we might hope the aforementioned type of 
philosophers will ultimately engage with more than just some paraphrase. However, as 
Kierkegaard says in Point of View, we must begin where our audience is.68
Thus, my position does not require Kierkegaard scholars—even those of an analytic 
bent, such as myself—to give up our stock in trade. However, it does oblige us to admit the 
flaws of our work in order to mitigate the damage we do. We must acknowledge that the style 
 
 17 
of our presentation can give a misleading impression of some of Kierkegaard’s writings. It 
can make our readers think he holds views or endorses courses of action he does not. 
Some might consider the request for such statements superfluous. Disclaimers already 
populate the literature on Kierkegaard.69 For instance, many scholars express hesitancy at 
attributing to him views he pens under pseudonyms.70 Several admit to the irony of writing 
philosophical commentaries on works that criticize philosophizing.71 More than a few 
confess that Kierkegaard’s goals were not primarily philosophical and that the value of his 
writings lies less in their academic contributions than in their ability to transform people’s 
lives.72
However, these particular qualifications fail to address the problem I raise. They do 
not mention how changing the style in which we communicate some of Kierkegaard’s 
positions misrepresents them. Therefore, we must add this concession to the ones usually 
provided. 
  
VI. The Self-Reference Problem 
A final consideration deserves attention. My paper appears to suffer from a self-reference 
problem. On the one hand, I argue that using an analytic writing style to paraphrase 
Postscript is misguided. On the other hand, I employ such a style, and do so while 
paraphrasing Postscript. Therefore, according to my own thesis, my paper is flawed.  
This problem evades an entirely satisfactory solution. Nevertheless, I can soften the 
blow. First, it will not do simply to dismiss my thesis as false. If my thesis is false, then there 
are no stylistic restrictions on paraphrasing Kierkegaard, and the analytic format I employ is 
perfectly acceptable. Thus, if my reasoning is otherwise sound, my conclusion still goes 
through. 
 18 
Matters might seem worse if my thesis is true. Under this hypothesis, my attempts to 
defend Kierkegaard’s position are flawed. Moreover, they are flawed precisely because they 
proceed in an analytic fashion. But my paper does not therefore lack all philosophical value. 
It still does something of philosophical merit—just not what meets the eye. Rather than 
offering a demonstration of my thesis, it provides a performance of my thesis. It illustrates 
how using the wrong style to paraphrase Kierkegaard creates difficulties, and such 
illustrations are compelling in their own right. 
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